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1 .  Introduction 
1 . 1 .  Overview 
Consider the three sentences in ( 1 ) :  
( 1 )  a .  I s  it raining? 
b. It ' s  raining? 
c. It ' s  raining. 
Rising polar interrogative 
Rising declarative 
Falling declarative 
The polar interrogative in ( l a) is the prototypical way to ask a yes/no question. 
(1 c) is a declarative with falling intonation, the canonical device for making a 
statement. The declarative with rising intonation, indicated by the question mark 
in ( 1b), is superficially more similar in function to ( 1 a) than ( 1 c) .  Thus, a familiar 
use of rising declaratives is as a kind of polar question: 
(2) It' s  raining? ::::; Is it raining? 
Intuitively, the rise seems to impart questioning force to what would otherwise be 
a statement. But the story cannot be as simple as (2) suggests. It  turns out that 
declarative questions are subject to contextual restrictions that don't apply to their 
interrogative counterparts. For example, declarative questions are not appropriate 
in situations where the questioner is supposed to be neutral or ignorant : 
(3) [at a committee hearing] 
a. Are you a member of the Communist party? 
b .  #You're a member of the Communist party? 
c. #You're a member of the Communist party. 
Furthermore, unlike interrogatives, declarative questions cannot be used "out of 
the blue". (4a) is felicitous as an initial remark, without any preceding discussion 
of persimmons, while (4b) and (4c) are odd in the same situation. 
(4) [to coworker eating a piece of fruit] 
a. Is that a persimmon? 
b .  #That ' s  a persimmon? 
c. #That' s a persimmon. 
The fact that falling declaratives (indicated with a period in (3c)-(4c» are also 
unacceptable as questions in these circumstances is intuitively unsurprising but 
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nonetheless significant. Given that nsmg declaratives pattern with falling 
declaratives rather than interrogatives in the above examples, it is natural to seek 
an explanation for the constraints in the common element of declarative form, and 
that is exactly the approach I will take here. 
At the same time, the intuition that rising declaratives are more natural as 
questions than falling ones is undeniable. Examples like (5), where the rising 
declarative patterns with the interrogative, support that intuition: 
(5) A:  The king of France is bald. 
B ' s  response :  
a. Is France a monarchy? 
b .  France is a monarchy? 
c .  #France is a monarchy. 
Since (5b) and (5c) differ only in their intonational contour, we must look to the 
rise for an explanation of the question-like behavior of rising declaratives. In the 
account given here, the explanation crucially depends not just upon the meaning 
of the rise but on its interaction with declarative form and with the context. 
The goal of the paper is to characterize the distribution of declaratives as 
questions and provide a compositional analysis from which both the restrictions 
and the questioning use follow. Section 2 introduces distributional data and 
formulates two of the empirical generalizations on which the analysis is based: 
(6) Declaratives are not neutral; they convey a bias that interrogatives lack. 
(7) Rising declaratives, like syntactic interrogatives, fail to commit the 
Speaker to their propositional content. 
Section 3 implements a contextual treatment of bias and neutrality, using an 
articulated version of Stalnaker' s  ( 1 978) Common Ground to track each 
participant' s  commitments individually. Section 4 gives an update semantics for 
rising and falling declaratives from which (6) and (7) follow, accounting for 
examples like (3) and (5). 
The restriction exemplified by (4) is treated in Section 5, where I present 
data supporting the descriptive generalization in (8) : 
(8) Declaratives can be used as questions only in contexts where the 
Addressee is understood as publicly committed to the proposition 
expressed. 
The guiding hypothesis in explaining the restriction is that questions must be 
uninformative with respect to the Addressee - a requirement that declaratives can 
only meet in certain contexts . The analysis predicts, correctly, that in addition to 
their familiar "echoing" function, rising declaratives may be used to question 
presuppositions and inferences taken to follow from the Addressee ' s  public 
position, whether or not such inference finds its basis in a preceding utterance. 
1 25 
1 26 Christine Gunlogson 
1 .2 .  Assumptions 
I rely on the minimal-pair methodology exemplified in (3)-(5) :  rising declaratives 
are compared with interrogatives on the one hand and with falling declaratives on 
the other, holding constant the lexical content and nuclear accent placement. 
Interrogatives, too, can have rising or falling intonation, but I restrict attention to 
the rising variety. The terms (polar) interrogative and declarative refer to 
syntactic sentence types, while (polar) question is the name of a pragmatic 
category to which utterances of both interrogatives and declaratives can belong. 
Rising and falling intonation are indicated with the standard orthographic 
devices ' ? '  and ' . ' ,  respectively. I count as a "rise" any contour whose tail (i .e . ,  
post-nuclear portion) is non-falling and which ends at a point higher than the 
nuclear accent. Similarly, a "fall" is non-rising and ends at a point lower than the 
nuclear accent. These categories are adapted from Gussenhoven 1 983  but can be 
expressed in other systems as well. For example, the above description of the rise 
fits the tunes L * H H%, L * H L %, L * L H%, and H* H H% in the system of 
Pierrehumbert 1 980, as modified in Beckman and Pierrehumbert 1 986 .  
Gussenhoven' s  system posits three basic contour shapes, the rise, the fall, 
and the fall-rise, with variations expressed in terms of modifications to each type. 
I ignore the fall-rise and the inventory of modifications to the basic contours. 
2. Distributional generalizations 
2 . 1 .  Declarative bias 
This section documents ways in which rising declaratives pattern with falling 
ones, differing from interrogatives. The central observation is that declaratives are 
unacceptable wherever the Speaker is expected to remain ignorant or neutral . As 
(9) shows, declaratives cannot be used to elicit information in an unbiased way: 
(9) [in a job interview] 
a. Have you been convicted of a felony? 
b. #y ou've been convicted of a felony? 
c. #y ou've been convicted of a felony. 
( 1 0) illustrates that the issue raised by a declarative question cannot be regarded 
as open or unsettled, liable to go either way. In fact, in ( 1 1 )  the rising declarative 
cannot be described as a question at all, even though the construction is one that 
accepts a root clause, as the subject-auxiliary inversion in ( l l a) demonstrates .  
( 1 0) It ' s  an open question. 
a. Did she lie to the grand jury? 
b.  #She lied to the grand jury. 
c. #She lied to the grand jury. 
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( 1 1 )  a. The question is, does he have the money? 
b .  The question is, #he has the money? 
c.  The question is, #he has the money. 
Interrogatives, but not declaratives, can extend a line of inquiry using if so 
or ifnot, as in the question from a health insurance form in ( 1 2a) .  
( 1 2) Are you married? 
a. If so, does your spouse have health insurance? 
b .  #If so ,  your spouse has health insurance? 
c. #If so, your spouse has health insurance. 
Declaratives make poor speculative questions, i .e . ,  questions designed to 
instigate thought or discussion without necessarily being answered or answerable. 
( 1 3a) might lead into a discussion of the JFK assassination without committing 
the Speaker to any particular view; ( 1 3b )-(1 3c) cannot be used to the same effect. 
( 1 3) a. Did Oswald act alone? 
b. #Oswald acted alone? 
c. #Oswald acted alone. 
As is already evident, the restrictions on declarative questions extend 
beyond standard "information question" contexts. A particularly clear illustration 
can be seen in ( 1 4), where the interrogative functions as a polite request for action 
rather than for information. Declaratives do not share this function. 
( 1 4) a. Can you (please) pass the salt? 
b .  #Y ou can (please) pass the salt? 
c. #Y ou can (please) pass the salt. 
The descriptive generalization I advance for the examples so far is given in (6) : 
(6) Declaratives are not neutral; they convey a bias that interrogatives lack. 
In offering (6) as a descriptive generalization I also offer an implicit hypothesis 
about the use of interrogatives in the contexts illustrated - namely, that certain 
functions of interrogatives involve at least the appearance of neutrality. I won't 
attempt to justify this hypothesis explicitly, which would require case-by-case 
study of the various uses seen above. Rather, I will take (6) as a reasonable 
working description, seeking a characterization of the notions of neutrality and 
bias with the expectation that they will ultimately be useful in understanding the 
range of discourse functions available for interrogatives as well as declaratives . 
The flip side to the patterns seen so far is that declaratives are useful when 
bias rather than neutrality is called for. When it comes to contributing new 
information, bias is a good thing. This is a given for falling declaratives, the 
prototypical way to offer a piece of news. But rising declaratives, too, have 
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infonnative potential for many speakers, as seen in ( 1 5) . 1 (See Pierrehumbert 
1 980 for a similar contrast.) Interrogatives do not share this function. 
( 1 5) a. #Is my name Carl? #Will I be your waiter tonight? 
b.  My name is Carl? I ' ll be your waiter tonight? 
c. My name is Carl. I ' ll be your waiter tonight. 
The main concern of this paper is the use of declaratives as questions; but the 
possibility of infonnative use will be allowed for by the analysis. 
There are other systematic distinctions between declaratives and 
interrogatives, including the fact that interrogatives, but not declarative questions, 
support polarity items like any and ever (Hirst 1 983 ,  Huddleston 1 994) : 
( 1 6) a. Is anybody home? 
b. #Anybody's home? 
c.  #Anybody' s home. 
Such facts do not fit in any obvious way under the generalization in (6), but they 
do support the general view defended here - namely, that declarative questions 
are not simply a variant of interrogatives, but have their own distinct properties. 
2.2. Lack of Speaker commitment 
A second crucial observation is that rising declaratives are more natural as 
questions than falling ones. In this section I support the intuition empirically by 
showing that rising declaratives pattern in certain ways with interrogatives. The 
generalization advanced is that rising declaratives, like interrogatives, fail to 
commit the Speaker to their propositional content. This point emerges in 
comparison with falling declaratives, which evidently do commit the Speaker. 
First note that rising declaratives, like interrogatives, allow for readings in 
which the Speaker is understood to be skeptical about the proposition expressed. 
In ( 1 7), either an interrogative or a declarative may be used to acknowledge 
and/or elliptically reiterate A's  utterance; but only (a) and (b) are compatible with 
B ' s  follow-up remark, which suggests that B remains doubtful about the alleged 
improvement. The falling declarative in ( 1 7c) conveys overt agreement with A's  
opinion, and thus has the effect of  inconsistency with the skeptical follow-up. 
( 1 7) [A&B are looking at a co-worker' s  battered and dented car] 
A: His driving has gotten a lot better. 
B ' s  response:  
a .  Has it? I don't see much evidence of that. 
b .  It has? I don't see much evidence of that. 
c. It has . #1 don't see much evidence of that. 
This skeptical reading of rising declaratives is well known, and is often assumed 
to be connected to their "echoing" function. But it would be a mistake to assume 
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that rising declaratives are inherently skeptical (or inherently echoing, for that 
matter). Rising declaratives, like interrogatives, also allow for readings in which 
the Speaker is understood as routinely accepting the proposition expressed, as 
illustrated in ( 1 8), where the falling declarative is acceptable as well . 
( 1 8) A:  That copier is broken. B ' s  response :  
a. Is it? Thanks, I ' ll use a different one. 
b .  I t  i s?  Thanks, I ' ll use a different one. 
c. (Oh), it is. Thanks, I ' ll use a different one. 
Example (5), repeated from Section 1 . 1 ,  does not echo A' s utterance but 
rather questions one of its presuppositions. Again, the interrogative and rising 
declarative are fine, while the falling declarative is not. 
(5) A: The king of France is bald. 
B ' s  response:  
a .  Is France a monarchy? 
b .  France is a monarchy? 
c .  #France is a monarchy. 
Like the earlier examples, (5a)-(5b) are compatible with either skepticism or 
acceptance by the Speaker. The follow-up remark provides the clue to the 
Speaker' s attitude. By themselves, (5a)-(5b) are noncommittal, imposing no 
constraints on interpretation of the Speaker's  position. 
The final observation of this section is that rising declaratives, like 
interrogatives, may make the point that the Addressee, rather than the Speaker, is 
in a position to know whether the proposition expressed is true. Consider ( 1 9) :  
( 1 9) a .  I s  shoplifting fun? 
b. Shoplifting' s  fun? 
c. #Shoplifting' s  fun. [# as an insinuation about the Addressee] 
Under the right circumstances, asking ( 1 9a) or ( 1 9b) can be a sly way to 
communicate that the Addressee is known to shoplift. The answer given by the 
Addressee is immaterial; the damage is done by the question itself, which seems 
to carry an assumption on the level of a presupposition that the person addressed 
is knowledgeable on the subject. (See Hudson 1 975 for a similar suggestion.) 
What makes the insinuation work so well above is the predicate fun,  which calls 
for subj ective evaluation. (Compare Is shoplifting a crime?/Shoplifting 's a 
crime?,  which lack the effect.) It generally takes personal experience to judge 
whether an activity is fun. Thus, if the Addressee is presumed knowledgeable 
about whether shoplifting is fun, it will also be presumed that the Addressee has 
shoplifted. 
The important point at present is that the (a) and (b) examples of ( 1 9) do 
not convey anything about the Speaker 's larcenous habits . By comparison, the 
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most natural reading of the falling declarative in ( 1 9c) portrays the Speaker as the 
source of information, suggesting that it is the Speaker who has shoplifted. 
The twin generalizations that emerge in this section are given in (20)-(2 1 ) :  
(20) Rising declaratives, like interrogatives, fail to commit the Speaker to their 
propositional content. 
(2 1 )  Falling declaratives do commit the Speaker to their propositional content. 
It follows from (20) that rising declaratives, like interrogatives, allow for a range 
of Speaker attitudes to be attributed. Falling declaratives, on the other hand, are 
compatible only with attitudes consistent with commitment. 
2 . 3 .  Reconciling bias with lack of commitment 
The outline suggested by the data so far is as follows : 
• A declarative expresses (some degree of) commitment to its content, 
consistent with interpretation of declarative questions as having an element of 
' assertiveness' or 'bias ' .  (See, e .g . ,  Bolinger 1 957,  Huddleston 1 994.) 
• The rise expresses lack of commitment to its propositional content, consistent 
with interpretation as a question. 
Equally intuitively, these two generalizations seem contradictory as stated. The 
challenge to be addressed in this section is how to reconcile them in a principled 
way that leads to testable predictions about distribution. 
The hypothesis I will implement is given informally in (22)-(23) : 
(22) Rising declaratives commit the Addressee to the proposition expressed. 
(23) Falling declaratives commit the Speaker to the proposition expressed. 
In compositional terms, I take declaratives to express commitment to their 
propositional content p, where commitment rules out the alternative, 1'. The 
intonational component specifies which participant is committed: the Addressee 
with a rise, the Speaker with a fall. Rising declaratives do fail to commit the 
Speaker to p. But rising declaratives also express commitment to p on the part of 
the Addressee, allowing for an understanding of the bias . 
In the account to follow, bias is characterized in contextual terms. The use 
of a (rising or falling) declarative with propositional content p ensures that the 
context is one in which the participants cannot easily come to agreement on 1'. 
By committing one participant to p, the declarative rules out l' as a mutual 
assumption, effectively conveying a bias toward p .  
The idea that rising vs . falling intonation i s  related to  a Speaker! Addressee 
distinction has precedents in the intonational literature, though none are 
developed in the particular direction taken here. In recent work, Steedman 2000 
proposes that the H% vs. L% boundary tone distinction (using the Beckman and 
Pierrehumbert system) correlates with 'ownership ' of the content expressed. The 
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proposal of Merin and Bartels 1 997 that the rise ' alienates choice to Alter' while 
the fall ' appropriates choice for Ego' offers a related idea as well. Noh' s 1 998 
Relevance-Theoretic discussion of 'echo questions ' relies on the idea of 
attributing the thought expressed to the Addressee, although Noh does not single 
out intonation as a factor. The present account is compatible in a broad way with 
these suggestions and can be seen as a development of the shared core notion of 
tying an intonational contrast to a Speaker! Addressee distinction. 
3. The discourse context 
I begin with the familiar notion of the Common Ground (Stalnaker 1 978) .  Under 
Stalnaker' s  classic treatment, the Common Ground (hereafter CG) is a set of 
propositions representing what the participants in a discourse take to be mutually 
believed, or at least mutually assumed for the purposes of the discourse .  I assume, 
as Stalnaker does, a framework in which a proposition is construed as a set of 
worlds, the worlds of which it is true, leading to the following characterization: 
(24) CG{A,B } = { p E p eW) : p is a mutual belief of the discourse participants A 
and B }  
Equivalently, the context c an  be construed as the set o f  worlds of which the 
mutual beliefs are true, i .e . ,  nCG (in Stalnaker' s  terminology, the context set) . 
The mutual beliefs constituting the CG are, crucially, mutual and not just 
shared. Beliefs that remain private, and beliefs that the participants happen to 
have in common without mutually realizing it, do not qualify. The contents of the 
CG thus depend crucially on who the participants are and what they know about 
each other' s  beliefs .  (24) makes that dependency explicit by incorporating 
mention of the participants in the definition. This is a departure from usual 
practice but does not introduce any new assumptions. 
The step needed for the present analysis is to separate out the beliefs 
mutually attributed to each participant. (25) accomplishes this task, defining a 
more articulated version of the CG in terms of public belief without making any 
essential changes to the basic conception. 
(25) Let DCA and DCB be sets of propositions representing the public beliefs 
of A and B, respectively, where : 
a. p is a public belief of A iff 'A believes p '  is a mutual belief of A and B 
b .  p is a public belief of B iff 'B believes p '  is a mutual belief of A and B 
The set of propositions associated with each participant represents that 
participant' s  public beliefs, or discourse commitments (DC) - public in the sense 
that that person is mutually recognized as committed to them. All mutual beliefs 
are public, but a public belief of an individual does not have to be mutual . 
The context can now be represented as an ordered pair <DCA, DCB>, 
replacing CG{A,B } (still derivable as DCAnDCB.) Or, equivalently and more 
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conveniently, the context can be construed as an ordered pair of sets of worlds, 
analogous to Stalnaker' s  context set. In (26) I adopt the latter construal. Here the 
abbreviation cs stands for the commitment set of an individual, the set of worlds 
of which that individual ' s  public beliefs are true. 
(26) Let a discourse context C be < CSA, CSB >, where: 
a. A and B are the discourse participants 
b .  CSA(C) = { W E W: A's  public beliefs are all true of w} 
c.  CSB (C) = { W E  W: B's public beliefs are all true of w} 
Just as the Common Ground is recoverable given DCA and DCB, the Stalnakerian 
context set is recoverable from <CSA, CSB> as CSA U CSB . 
To illustrate how the divided context works, consider a discourse in which 
A and B publicly disagree on some point. Suppose that A has said that cats make 
better pets than dogs, while B favors dogs . Let q stand for the proposition 
expressed by Cats make better pets than dogs. Clearly q is not a mutual belief, 
since A and B are in disagreement on this very point. Of course -'q is not a 
mutually held proposition either, since A's belief is in conflict with it. Still, q does 
figure indirectly in the Common Ground, which records their mutual beliefs about 
each other' s  positions. That is, the fact that A believes q itself has the status of a 
mutual belief, as does the fact that B believes a proposition entailing -'q 
(assuming, as I do here, that the participants' statements reflect their beliefs). 
The formalism just introduced makes the descriptive task easy in this 
situation: q is a discourse commitment of A's  (that is, CSA c q), and -'q is a 
discourse commitment of B ' s  (CSB c W-q). Neither q nor -'q can become a mutual 
belief in this context, at least not without revision. Let us call both q and W-q 
controversial with respect to the context. The relevant notions are defined below. 
(27) P is a commitment in C of an individual discourse participant X iff cSx � p .  
(28) P is a joint commitment in C iff p is a commitment of all participants. 
(29) p is unresolved in C iff neither p nor W-p is a joint commitment. 
(30) p is controversial in C iff W-p is a commitment of at least one discourse 
participant and p is unresolved in C.  
A second type of situation in which q may be a public belief without being 
mutual is the following. Suppose A commits to q, as before. Consider the 
discourse state before B makes any response. At this point q is not a joint 
commitment, though it may become one without further ado if B indicates 
agreement. W -q is not a joint commitment, either, but its status is different from 
that of q. While q just needs ratification by B to become a j oint commitment, W-q 
is not eligible as a joint commitment at all, given that A has already committed to 
q. In an obvious way the context is biased toward q;  only q can be admitted as a 
mutual belief without requiring (non-monotonic) revision. 
This simple and intuitive notion of contextual bias is what I will use in 
accounting for the bias of declaratives. The definitions are given in (3 1 )-(33) .  
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(3 1 )  C i s  empty iff there i s  at least one cSx in C such that cSx = 0 .  
(32) C is biased toward p iff C is not empty, W -p is controversial, and p is not 
controversial .  
(33) C is neutral with respect to p iff C is not empty and neither p nor W -p is 
controversial .  
Contextual bias exists if mutual agreement on p is possible (without revision) 
while mutual agreement on W -p is ruled out due to an existing commitment to p 
by at least one discourse participant. If the context is in a neutral state with respect 
to p, then joint commitment to either p or W -p is possible in principle. 
The contextual states introduced here are not particular to the analysis of 
declaratives . They offer a general way to talk about bias and neutrality that is 
potentially useful for handling other phenomena as well (e.g . ,  tag questions, 
negative polar interrogatives, and discourse particles) . The next step in the present 
analysis is to make the link with the semantics of rising and falling declaratives. 
4. Sentence and locution meaning 
4. 1 .  Declaratives 
The basic idea to be implemented in this section, following the tradition of update 
semantics, is that the meaning of a sentence is its context change potential, its 
CCP (Heim 1 982 and others) . Here, the CCP of a sentence is defined in terms of 
an update to a substructure of the context, the commitment set (cs) of an 
individual participant. The rise and fall serve to identify the individual cs to be 
updated, given an utterance context, i .e . ,  a context in which participants can be 
identified in the roles of Speaker and Addressee. 
I use the term locution, abbreviated L or � S, to designate the linguistic 
expression comprising a sentence of a given type plus the rise or fall, retaining the 
more traditional sentence for expressions not specified for intonational contour. 
This and other notational conventions are summarized in (34) . 
(34) a. tSdec1 : rising declarative locution 
b .  "l..Sdecl : falling declarative locution 
c.  tSinterr : rising polar interrogative locution 
d. S :  ranges over { Sdec]' Sinterr } 
e. L: ranges over { tsdec] ' "l..Sdec], tSinterr } 
f. � :  ranges over { t, "l.. } 
g. cSx: ranges over { CSA, CSB } 
The CCP of a declarative is defined with respect to an individual cSx, as in (35) ,  
where the descriptive content is the proposition expressed by the declarative : 
(35) cSx + Sdecl = {w E cSx:  the descriptive content Of Sdecl is true ofw} 
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CCPs for rising and falling locutions are given in (36) and (37), respectively: 
(36) C + t8 = C' such that: 
a. CSAddr (C') = CSAddr (C) + 8 
b. CSSpkr( C') = CSSpkr (C) 
(37) C + -!,S = C' such that: 
a. CSSpkr (C') = CSSpkr(C) + 8 
b .  CSAddr(C') = CSAddr (C) 
CSAddr is a function from an utterance context to either CSA or CSB, whoever is in the 
role of Addressee at the time of utterance; similarly for CSSpkr.2 
Combining the elements above, we arrive at the result in (38) for a rising 
declarative locution, and (39) for the falling version: 
(38) C + t8decJ = C' such that: 
a. CSSpkr(C') = CSSpkr (C) 
b .  CSAddr(C') = CSAddr (C) + 8dec1 
(39) C + -!,8decl = C' such that: 
a. CSSpkr(C') = CSSpkr (C) + 8decJ 
b .  CSAddr(C') = CSAddr (C) 
In each case the declarative component makes the same contribution: eliminating 
worlds from a commitment set of which the descriptive content is not true. The 
rise or fall is a function mapping a sentence meaning to a context update function 
that applies it to an individual commitment set, leaving the other commitment sets 
unchanged. Locution meaning follows compositionally, as summarized in (40) : 
(40) ILl = 1 � 1 ( 18 1) = function from C to C' such that cS x of C' = 1 8 1 (cs x )  and C ' 
is otherwise identical to C 
Following Heim 1 983,  I treat updates as partial functions, defined only for 
contexts in which presuppositions are satisfied. A context admits a sentence only 
if presuppositions are met (or accommodatable) .  I generalize the notion of 
admittance to locutions and contexts as well sentences and commitment sets, as 
defined in (4 1 )-(42) . Finally, I assume that presuppositions must be satisfied with 
respect to joint commitments rather than individual sets, as (42) provides . 
(4 1 )  cSx admits 8 iff for all r such that r i s  a presupposition of 8 ,  cSx c r. 
(42) C admits � 8 iff for all cSx in C, cSx admits 8 .  
The operations cSx + 8 and C + L are defined only if  cSx admits 8 and C admits L, 
respectively. This approach distinguishes between presuppositional content and 
primary descriptive content in a way that seems accurate: presuppositions cannot 
be controversial, as the propositional content proper can be. 
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A locution is consistent only if the update does not result in an empty cs:  
(43) L is consistent with a context C iff C admits L and C + L is not empty. 
4.2 .  Interrogatives 
Consistent with (36), I assume that an interrogative with rising intonation operates 
on the commitment set of the Addressee. Interrogatives, however, do not commit 
the Addressee to their content, or the Speaker either. In fact, interrogatives differ 
crucially from declaratives in not expressing commitment at all .  The CCP of an 
interrogative is thus just an identity function on the targeted commitment set. 
(44) cSx + Sinterr = cSx 
Effectively, C + tSinterr = C.  Note that the treatment of presuppositions generalizes 
to interrogatives, a significant advantage given that interrogatives carry the same 
presuppositions as their declarative counterparts. 
This treatment does not do justice to our intuitions about interrogatives. 
Intuitively, a context in which an interrogative has been uttered is not identical to 
one lacking the interrogative utterance. I assume that polar interrogatives do have 
non-trivial effects on aspects of the discourse context not represented here. See 
Btiring 1 995 ,  Roberts 1 996, and Groenendijk 1 999 for examples of  enriching the 
contextual representation to model interrogative updates .  Proposals agree, 
however, on the point that matters here - polar interrogatives do not commit any 
participant to their descriptive content. 3 
4.3 . Locutionary bias and neutrality 
The bias or neutrality of a locution can be derived from the contextual states 
produced, as (45)-(46) state. 
Given a locution L with descriptive content p and a context C that admits L :  
(45) L is neutral with respect to C iff C + L is neutral with respect to p. 
(46) L is biasing with respect to C iff C is neutral with respect to p and C + L is 
biased toward p. 
It follows from (35), together with (45), that no use of a declarative can be 
neutral. There are two types of outcome when a (consistent) declarative is uttered. 
Either the declarative has the effect of eliminating some worlds from the cs of 
some participant, resulting in a state of controversy or bias; or the declarative is 
uninformative. A declarative can only be uninformative, however, if the context is 
already non-neutral, that is, if worlds of which the content is not true are already 
absent from the targeted cs. Similarly, it follows from the identity-function 
definition of an interrogative CCP in (44) that no occurrence of an interrogative 
can be biasing. The generalizations in (47)-(48) thus have the status of theorems : 
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(47) No �Sdec1 is neutral with respect to any C.  
(48) No �Sinterr is biasing with respect to any C.  
Note that i t  does not follow that all declaratives are biasing, nor that an 
interrogative locution is always neutral. A locution is biasing only if it effects a 
transition from a neutral to a biased context. Similarly, interrogatives qualify as 
neutral only when uttered in a neutral context. 
The unacceptability of declaratives illustrated in Section 2 . 1 follows 
directly from (47) . By hypothesis, those examples involved situations requiring 
the Speaker to maintain (at least the appearance of) neutrality. Use of a 
declarative, whatever the intended function of the move, is guaranteed to result in 
a non-neutral context, in violation of the expectation of neutrality. 
The examples of Section 2.2 are also accounted for. Since the Speaker 
uttering a rising declarative does not commit herself to the content uttered, the 
range of attitudes shown to be possible is perfectly consistent with the proposal. 
4.4. Entailment, uninformativeness, and vacuousness 
Entailment is defined as a relation between a context and a locution, as in (49), or 
between a sentence and a commitment set, as in (50) .  
(49) C 1= L iff C  admits L and C + L = C 
(50) cs 1= S iff cs admits S and cs + S = cs 
The idea behind the definitions in (49)- (50), extending Groenendijk  1 999, is that 
a sentence or locution is entailed when its effect has already been achieved. 
A notion that will be important in the next section is uninformativeness : 
(Un)informativeness with respect to a commitment set 
(5 1 ) � S is informative with respect to csx(C) iff C  admits � S and cSx 'FI= S .  
(52) � S is uninformative with respect to csx(C) iff C  admits � S and cSx 1= S .  
Derivatively, a locution may b e  (un)informative with respect to the context : 
(53) � S is informative with respect to C iff it is informative with respect to at 
least one cs in C.  
(54) � S is uninformative with respect to C iff it is uninformative with respect 
to every cs in C.  
According to (5 1 )-(52), a locution that is entailed by a context may still be 
informative. Informativeness is defined in terms of the potential effect of S on a 
cs, without regard to whether the locutionary update actually operates on that cs. 
Interrogatives are always uninformative. Declaratives, however, are 
potentially informative, even in contexts where they are entailed. For a declarative 
locution to be uninformative with respect to the context, it must be the case that 
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its content is already a joint commitment of both participants. To describe this sort 
of case I define one final notion, that of vacuousness : 
(55) L is vacuous with respect to C iff p  is a joint commitment in C ,  where p is 
the descriptive content of L. 
Any locution that is vacuous with respect to a context is also uninformative in that 
context and entailed by it. But an uninformative locution is not necessarily 
vacuous; interrogatives aren't  vacuous just because they are uninformative. 
Note that a rising interrogative (as well as a declarative), may be 
consistent with a (non-empty) context in which the Addressee is already 
committed to its descriptive content. Intuitively, an interrogative is redundant in 
such circumstances. Given that the Addressee ' s  commitment to p is already a 
matter of public record, the interrogative seems to be calling for a response that is 
bound to be uninformative. It is common practice in modeling discourse to focus 
on informativeness in terms of the literal content of utterances . Hence, many 
models of discourse incorporate rules that prohibit uninformative statements, 
along with barring interrogatives whose answers would be uninformative. For the 
present account, however, it is crucial that the uninformativeness (or redundancy) 
of an utterance be understood as distinct from its felicity. The fact is that what we 
may think: of as 'confirming questions ' ,  i .e . ,  questions to which an answer has 
already been given, are felicitous . Examples ( 1 7)-( 1 8) demonstrate that, and 
Section 5 .2 will provide further examples. 
In this paper, which focuses on questions, the property of 
uninformativeness defined above is of more concern than informativeness .  To 
preview the argument of the next section, the claim I will defend with respect to 
declaratives is that they are interpretable as questions only when uninformative 
with respect to the Addressee ' s  commitment set. The data to be introduced in 
Section 5 .2 will show that this generalization is accurate. 
Restricting attention to uninformative rising declaratives allows me to 
sidestep the issue of what it means for a speaker to make a move that has the 
effect of modifying the Addressee 's  public commitments. I assume that such 
moves are possible. This is the door I wi11 leave open for future accounts of the 
informative use of rising declaratives exemplified in ( 1 5), without, however, 
pursuing the topic further in this paper. 
5. Questioning 
5 . 1 .  Uninformativeness and questioning: a hypothesis 
The update semantics for rising and falling declaratives, together with the 
definitions of contextual bias and neutrality given in Section 3 ,  account for the 
observed bias of declaratives as well as the differences between rising and falling 
declaratives documented in Section 2 .2 .  Two matters remain to be addressed: 
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• What is the connection between the meaning proposed for rising declaratives 
- committing the Addressee to the proposition expressed - and the natural 
interpretation of rising declaratives as questions? 
• Why can't declarative questions be used out of the blue? (Recall example (4) .)  
In this section I claim that these two points are related, and sketch the outline of  a 
treatment of questioning; see Gunlogson 200 1 for a more complete discussion. 
The hypothesis guiding the analysis is that uninformativeness with respect 
to the Addressee is necessary for an utterance to qualify as a polar question: 
(56) An utterance of a locution L is a polar question in C only if L is 
uninformative with respect to CSAddr(C) . 
Since interrogatives are always uninformative, they are guaranteed to satisfy (56) .  
Declaratives are a different matter. Since a declarative is potentially informative, 
whether a particular declarative utterance is informative with respect to the 
Addressee ' s  commitments or not crucially depends on the context in which it is 
uttered. Declaratives satisfy (56) only in contexts in which the Addressee ' s  public 
commitments entail the proposition expressed. In such contexts, the Speaker 
cannot be construed as intending to tell the Addressee that p holds . My claim is 
that this public clue to the Speaker' s  intentions is prerequisite for the success of a 
declarative question. 
In the next section I support the claim empirically by showing that 
declaratives can function as questions only where they meet the criterion of 
uninformativeness .  For clarity I give a version of the condition tailored to 
declarative questions in (57) and call it  the Contextual Bias Condition : 
Contextual Bias Condition on declarative questions 
(57) An utterance of � Sdecl with descriptive content p is interpretable as a polar 
question in C only if CSAddr(C) C p .  
The Contextual Bias Condition is quite strong in a particular way: i t  demands that 
the Addressee ' s  commitment be a public belief. Compare (57) to the weaker 
alternative stated in (58) :  
Alternative version (to be rejected) 
(58) An utterance of � Sdec1 with descriptive content p is interpretable as a polar 
question in C only if it is plausible from the Speaker' s point of view that 
the Addressee believes p.  
The important difference between (57) and (58) is that the latter allows for the 
Speaker' s  private information about the Addressee ' s  private belief state to license 
the rising declarative question, while the former insists that the Addressee ' s  belief 
(and hence the Speaker 's  awareness of it) must be pUblic. 
For the explanation advanced above, motivating the Contextual Bias 
Condition in terms of uninformativeness, the stronger version is crucial . The 
reason is simply that the Speaker' s private beliefs, being private, cannot give the 
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Addressee the kind of clue to the Speaker 's  intention that public 
uninfonnativeness provides. When the Addressee 's  prior commitment to p is 
mutually recognized, the Addressee can be sure that the Speaker' s use of an 
uninfonnative declarative is deliberate, and pragmatic reasoning about intentions 
can proceed accordingly. We need not rely exclusively on this conceptual 
argument, however. (57) will be supported empirically in the next section. 
The Contextual Bias Condition is put forward as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for questioning. For discussion of sufficiency conditions for 
questioning, see Gunlogson 200 1 ,  where a distributional notion of ' question' is 
argued for. The full argument cannot be presented here, but it can be noted in the 
examples throughout this paper that rising declaratives, in contexts where they 
function in ways we are inclined to call questioning, are interpretable in the same 
ways as their interrogative counterparts in those contexts .  The solution suggested 
by this pattern is simple: rising declaratives operate as polar questions when (and 
because) their contextual requirements and effects overlap with those of polar 
interrogatives . Falling declaratives do not overlap in the same way, and their 
diminished aptitude as questions follows. 
5 .2 .  The Contextual Bias Condition on declarative questions 
The data in this section center around the observation that declaratives cannot 
readily be used as questions 'out of the blue ' .  That is, interrogatives may initiate 
discourses in ways that the corresponding declarative questions may not. (59a),  
but not (59b-c), can be used to strike up a conversation with a stranger about his 
dog. Similarly, (60a), but not (60b) or (60c), is a standard way of beginning a 
telephone conversation in the hopes of speaking to Laura. 
(59) [to passerby walking a dog] 
Pardon me, but . . .  
a. Is that a Weimaraner? 
b. #That' s  a Weimaraner? 
c. #That ' s  a Weimaraner. 
(60) [initiating a phone conversation] 
a. Is Laura there? 
b. #Laura' s  there? 
c. #Laura' s  there. 
The awkwardness of the declaratives in (59)-(60) does not follow from the 
account of declarative bias . We expect, in light of that account, that a question 
asked via a declarative will be non-neutral. But here, unlike the cases exemplified 
in Section 2, there is no plausible expectation of neutrality from the Speaker to be 
violated by the declarative question. Suppose, for instance, that the Speaker of 
(59b) privately knows or suspects that the dog is a Weimaraner. In fact, it is 
difficult to avoid making that assumption, even for the interrogative in (59a), 
given that the Speaker has chosen to ask a polar question about a particular breed 
1 39 
140 Christine Gunlogson 
rather than simply asking what kind of dog it is. Why should it be so odd for the 
Speaker to ask a non-neutral declarative question, in effect conveying her own 
positive bias by way of conveying an expectation that the Addressee will agree? 
Furthermore, it is not sufficient for the Speaker to have a private reason 
for believing that the Addressee believes p. The Speaker in (59), in addition to 
suspecting that the dog is a Weimaraner, may also suspect that the owner knows 
what kind of dog it is; owners of purebred dogs very often do. It seems to follow 
that the Speaker can reasonably assume that the Addressee believes the dog to be 
a Weimaraner (though nothing in the context allows the Addressee to reconstruct 
that reasoning.) The problem is that adding these background suppositions about 
the Speaker' s private assumptions fails to improve the declarative question. The 
stronger demand of the Contextual Bias Condition must be met. . One of the agreeable consequences of that condition is that the "echo" 
uses of rising declaratives fall out naturally. The situation where the Addressee 
has already stated the content presented by the declarative question is just a 
special case subsumed under the more general condition given in (57) .  
It cannot be claimed, however, that declarative questions must always 
echo some preceding utterance. We have already seen that presuppositions may 
be questioned, a result that is compatible with the Contextual Bias Condition but 
not with an echoing requirement. Another compatible result is that the Speaker 
can use a declarative question to present an inference interpretable as a 
consequence of the Addressee ' s  position, as shown in (6 1 )-(62) . In these 
examples all three locutions are acceptable, and all suggest that A' s  speech act has 
led the Speaker to the conclusion expressed by the descriptive content. 
(6 1 )  A :  Jon has to leave early. 
B ' s  response :  
a. Will he miss the party then? 
b.  He' ll miss the party then? 
c. He' ll miss the party then. 
(62) A to caller: Mom, I ' ll call you back tomorrow, OK? 
Caller: 
a. Are you too busy to talk to your mother? 
b .  You're too busy to talk to your mother? 
c .  (I see.) You're too busy to talk to your mother. 
Bartels 1 997 and Noh 1 998 also make the point that sentences functioning as 
' echoes ' are not limited to repeating previously uttered content. 
The propositions expressed by the Speaker in (6 1 )-(62) clearly are not 
logical entailments of the sentence uttered previously. They're not even 
(necessarily) conversational implicatures, given that the preceding sentence may 
not ordinarily be taken to imply what the Speaker has chosen to represent as 
mutually inferrable from its utterance. I will assume that in these cases the 
declarative is accommodated as a question by making the necessary contextual 
adjustment to meet the Contextual Bias Condition. The adjustment required is the 
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portrayal of the proposition expressed by the declarative as following from the 
Addressee' s commitments. If we take p to be the content of the declarative 
question, what must be accommodated as a joint commitment of the participants 
is q � p, where q is a relevant public commitment of the Addressee ' s  that serves 
as the basis for the inference. 
The clearest evidence that declarative questions are not inherently echoes 
comes from contexts where there is no preceding utterance to echo at all .  
Compare (63) and (64) . In (63), the declaratives are infelicitous, as expected. 
(63) Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room with no information about 
current weather conditions when another person enters. 
Robin says to the newcomer: 
a. Is it raining? 
b. #It ' s  raining? 
c. #It ' s  raining. 
The revised version shows that the absence of an appropriate utterance cannot be 
the decisive factor in the infelicity of (63) .  In (64) there is pertinent extra­
linguistic evidence - the wet raingear - that makes possible to accommodate the 
Addressee ' s  public commitment, and the declaratives are accordingly improved. 
(64) Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room when another person 
enters. The newcomer is wearing a wet raincoat and boots. Robin says : 
a. Is it raining? 
b .  It ' s  raining? 
c .  (I  see that/So) It ' s  raining. 
The contrast between (63) and (64) is clear, and it establishes decisively that 
declarative questions do not require a linguistic antecedent. 
Summarizing this section, the facts show that no amount of tinkering with 
assumptions about private knowledge, private belief, or private evidence will 
render a declarative question felicitous in the absence of relevant public evidence. 
In its most obvious manifestation, the public evidence for the Addressee ' s  belief 
is the Addressee' s  own utterance. But the evidence need not be linguistic in 
nature, as long as the Contextual Bias Condition can be met (or accommodated) . 
The result arrived at empirically in this section is thus in agreement with the 
hypothesis advanced on more conceptual grounds in Section 5 . 1 .  
6. Summary 
In this paper I have given a compositional account of rising and falling 
declaratives, focusing on their use as questions and introducing a body of 
observations illustrating restrictions on such use.  Declaratives (in contrast to 
interrogatives) express commitment to their propositional content. Rising vs. 
falling intonation is responsible for attribution of the commitment to the 
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Addressee vs. the Speaker, respectively. The result is an inherent contextual 'bias ' 
associated with declaratives, distinguishing them from interrogatives.  
The picture that emerges is one in which intonational and sentence type 
meaning constrain how utterances with particular content function in discourse 
but do not determine their function. Understanding the questioning use of 
declaratives does not reduce to a problem of assigning 'question force '  but 
requires a deeper investigation of the complex interaction between context and 
formal elements. Declaratives function as questions only in contexts that provide 
the appropriate sort of support for conveying the Speaker' s  questioning intention. 
An important feature of the approach taken here is that the contextual 
restrictions are peculiar to the use of declaratives as questions. We do not expect 
to find declaratives intended as statements to be subject to them. The point is  
abundantly clear for falling declaratives, whose uses are obviously not confined to 
questioning. For rising declaratives, the existence of informative uses, like ( 1 5) ,  
becomes less mysterious. The current analysis cannot be said to predict the 
existence of such uses, but at least it doesn't  predict their nonexistence - giving it 
a head start on any account in which the rise is directly associated with a 
questioning function or an attitude of uncertainty on the part of the Speaker. 
Endnotes 
1 The question mark in ( 1 5b) marks rising intonation, not a questioning function. 
2 It should be clear that the meaning posited for the rise and fall is indexical in 
nature, on a par with the expressions such as L you, the Speaker, and the 
Addressee and amenable to the same sort of analytical treatment. 
3 By the descriptive content of an interrogative I mean the proposition expressed, 
in an obvious way - e.g. ,  It is raining for the interrogative Is it raining. 
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